By Adel Al Toraifi

Is there truly an “Arab Spring,” or is there in fact a conflict internally against the authorities, and externally between the countries that we consider influential in the regional balance of power? The truth lies between this and that. There is no doubt that there has been a transformation –on the surface-within the actual shape of government, its symbols, and its main pillars. In other words, there has been a change of leaders without there being any ideological or social changes affecting the citizens and the wider culture of governance in the region. Strong popular uprisings are still being staged across Arab cities and districts, and a state of congestion and rebellion prevails amongst a broad category of the youth generation. Yet part of this congestion and rage can be attributed to the economic situation, especially with soaring food prices since 2007 and worsening unemployment since 2008. The congestion can also be attributed to the stagnant situation in a number of Arab societies with regards to reform, political participation, corruption and the total exclusion of the opposition from government.

We should also notice that we have experienced some sort of disguised military coup d’etat in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, where the army, or parts of it, have seized the initiative and dissociated themselves from the head of state. Perhaps this explains why the Syrian uprising is stuttering, because it can be considered as civil strife (without military support) in the face of an imposing regime, indeed, more violent than all its predecessors. In Yemen as well, tribal and sectarian alliances have played a significant role in reaching the current impasse between the president and his opponents, at least so far.

The congestion can also be attributed to the stagnant situation in a number of Arab societies with regards to reform, political participation, corruption and the total exclusion of the opposition from government

However, the plain truth is that we are not facing a genuine change in the ideas or characters of the region, in what has been termed the Arab Spring. There are no “Founding Fathers,” nor is there an intellectual or cultural elite with a realistic project to change the ruling regime, raise the political awareness of the masses, or achieve the desired regional balance of power.

However, the plain truth is that we are not facing a genuine change in the ideas or characters of the region, in what has been termed the Arab Spring. There are no “Founding Fathers,” nor is there an intellectual or cultural elite with a realistic project to change the ruling regime, raise the political awareness of the masses, or achieve the desired regional balance of power.

A clear attempt is being made to portray the popular uprisings witnessed by some Arab states as “revolutions,” which will entail a change in the way of thinking and the nature of politics as we know it. Some have described what is happening as a democratic “revolution” against despotic and authoritarian rule. Yet reality shows that there are neither ideas nor political or intellectual elites who can lead the process of change towards a better future for the region. Rather, the traditional political factions and religious activists are attempting to ride the wave of change, although, as we can see, they have no intention to implement the change required in our region. In more than one country, some of these political and religious figures at the forefront of the scene have rushed to manipulate public issues and causes with the aim of achieving personal or political gains in the midst of the existing security and political chaos.

In a climate rife with political and emotional agitation, we can distinguish between three levels of the existing crisis in the Middle East: The first level is an internal one, where political factions compete to seize control of the political scene. The second is the regional level, where discussions over the distinctions between monarchies and a –populist- republics have surfaced. On the third level, the international level, some western states—including the US—have placed their hopes on change, in the belief that regime change will result in creating a better environment. Such a belief is a misconception based on “interventionist liberalism,” which portrays the Arab countries as currently undergoing a troubled phase in order to become liberal economies. Those who adopt such an illusionary conviction fail to realize that “freedom” in the American context does not necessarily mean freedom in the Middle Eastern context. In the former case, freedom means an individual’s freedom with regards to economic options and individual rights, whereas in the latter case of the Middle East, freedom means getting rid of foreign occupation and regimes that foster ties with the west.

the plain truth is that we are not facing a genuine change in the ideas or characters of the region, in what has been termed the Arab Spring

At the regional level, the attempt made by the Gulf States to include Jordan and Morocco in the GCC is evidence of a serious existing geopolitical vacuum, which has prompted these monarchies to approach one another and cooperate, despite the significant distance between them. This is because regional countries such as Iran, Syria, Iraq—and even Egypt—now have become unreliable to the Gulf states with regards to their foreign policies.

At the regional level, the attempt made by the Gulf States to include Jordan and Morocco in the GCC is evidence of a serious existing geopolitical vacuum, which has prompted these monarchies to approach one another and cooperate, despite the significant distance between them. This is because regional countries such as Iran, Syria, Iraq—and even Egypt—now have become unreliable to the Gulf states with regards to their foreign policies.

The most convincing evidence that the Arab Spring may be faltering, in a country like Egypt for example, comes from the fact that those in the interim—and unconstitutional—government are more concerned with pursuing the “remnants” of the past regime, releasing fundamentalist prisoners, and paying useless regional visits under the slogan of encouraging foreign investments. This all is happening at the time when Gulf and foreign projects in Egypt are being illegally nationalized. The government is doing so instead of addressing the deplorable economic condition, which we see everyday with the lack of wheat and fuel supplies, stagnant public corporations and banks, and the uncontrolled security and sectarian chaos.

Thomas Jefferson, one of the Founding Fathers of the United States, once said: “The natural progress of things is for liberty to yield and government to gain ground.” Perhaps, this is what we lack amidst the current chaotic stage.

First published in Asharq Alawsat Newspaper on  19/05/2011.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt recently announced that it had established an independent political party—the Freedom and Justice Party—to represent the group in the next elections. Clearly named in an attempt to keep pace with the current phase of popular uprisings, brotherhood member, Mohamed Morsy, said in his first statement as party head: “The [Muslim Brotherhood] Shura Council discussed many issues, and issued these decisions which we hope will be in the interest of Egypt, in light of the constitution and laws we hope will serve Egyptians.” He added that, “the party will be completely independent from the group [Muslim Brotherhood] in every way.”

How can the new party be independent from the Muslim Brotherhood?

How can the new party be independent from the Muslim Brotherhood? This is a legitimate question, for what is the need that prompts a group that is nearly 80 years old to establish a new [political] party that is administratively and politically independent from it? Those who know the subject of the Muslim Brotherhood justify this action under the pretext that the (amended) constitution still prohibits the establishment of [political] parties based upon religious platforms, which it does so in Article V.

But all that this means is that the oldest religious party in the region does not want to change its principle of politically exploiting religion, or re-draft its constitution to comply with the civil requirements of the national constitution. In other words this new party will be nothing more than a “front” for the old party. In truth, we do not know how a party can raise civil slogans whilst being owned by another party that raises religious ones, or how anybody can justify this legally and constitutionally. If the new party refers its establishment back to a decision made by the Shura Council of the Muslim Brotherhood, which raises a religious slogan, then the party by necessity is based on a religious platform that differentiates between citizens.

For more than six decades, writers and researchers have argued that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood party is made up of doves and hawks, and that reforming—or developing—the party is being prohibited by a group of the old guard. However, even after the latest change of names and faces, the party remains the same, along with its literature which was formulated in an atmosphere of conflict with now obsolete parties and clashes with former governments. Yet despite this, the brotherhood continues to garner new supporters.

The Muslim Brotherhood argues that they are “missionaries, not judges,” and that they stand against all forms of violence. This is relatively true in that the group has no recognized armed wing, but the problem with the Muslim Brotherhood is not whether it is armed or not, but that it promotes a fundamentalist culture that is at odds with the civil world. Meanwhile, the group has a supreme guide to whom all members must pledge allegiance.

The culture of the brotherhood is that there is only one path to take, namely “the Islamic solution,” or in other words, the totalitarian rule of the Muslim Brotherhood, which teaches its cadres religious extremism and fundamentalist discourse. In the end, however, the group says that it does not believe in bearing arms, and that this is part of the fiqh principle of ijtihad (making a decision based upon personal effort independent of any school of jurisprudence). The hadith, or words and deeds, of the Prophet claim that somebody who engages in ijtihad and reaches the correct conclusion receives two rewards [from God], whilst somebody who reaches a wrong conclusion nevertheless receives one reward.

 The culture of the brotherhood is that there is only one path to take, namely “the Islamic solution,” or in other words, the totalitarian rule of the Muslim Brotherhood, which teaches its cadres religious extremism and fundamentalist discourse.

Each time the Muslim Brotherhood addresses a crisis there is a reference to a speech here, or an interview there, made by a member (a dove) of the group saying that in its forthcoming program his party will move towards democracy, or respecting civil rights, or women’s rights, or freedom of expression, or rights for minorities. However, it is not long before another member (a hawk) comes out to release a statement invalidating all those rosy and idealistic statements, and the result is that the group changes its tactical positions, or political maneuvers, but nothing happens to suggest there is a genuine intellectual effort to change its (radical) ideology in order to become a civil party. Anyone who exerts a genuine effort ends up leaving the party, because the Muslim Brotherhood allows reform within its branches but not its foundations.

Some are optimistic that the brotherhood will have to change in a democratic or civil sense because of the “revolution” against tyranny that is currently dominant in the region, and by providing an opportunity for the Muslim Brotherhood to engage in political activity without restrictions, this will enhance its chances of becoming a civil entity after it has experienced power, and people will be able to judge the Muslim Brotherhood based on its performance, not its rhetoric. Yet these people forget they are talking about a D’awa group that believes people are straying off the righteous track, a group that has not changed its slogans until this day, so how could it accept the terms of the democratic game that are only available in a secular or civil climate? Why should the head of a totalitarian party take power immediately, whilst others must wait for to be granted their “freedom” and “justice?”!

First published in Asharq Alawsat Newspaper on 04/05/2011.

By Adel Al Toraifi

The majority of analysts examining Syrian affairs recently have been focusing on the regime’s evil history and on how the time has come for the majority to rebel against the rule of the minority, and reject five decades of the Baath party’s iron-fisted rule. Meanwhile, others are focusing on the mistakes being made by President Bashar al-Assad, in the manner in which he is handling the events taking place on the ground, presupposing that the regime is capable of containing the sudden uprising that has hit a number of Syrian cities by offering a package of concessions. However, other scenarios can still possibly occur, for the Syrian regime continues to hang on, and as of yet there are no signs of any major splits or division within the [Syrian] military or political institutions, whilst the demonstrations have yet to reach the regime’s important bases in the capital city Damascus.

Does this mean that the regime is secure? Not necessarily, for developments are taking place hour by hour, whilst the momentum [of the protestors] is increasing with every passing Friday. However it is important that we acknowledge the possibility that the regime may not collapse in the next few months, and we need only look at the Yemeni and Libyan examples to realize this. In Yemen, deep divisions have occurred within the ruling party’s structure, as well as amongst the President’s associates – or so we believe – and also within the army and amongst the Yemeni embassies abroad. In spite of all of this, the President still remains in power and continues to negotiate and maneuver to the extent that he prompted neighboring countries to propose an initiative that includes all possible guarantees for him in the event that he decides to step down. Whilst in Libya, the eastern cities joined together to stage a rebellion, whilst a number of senior state officials resigned from the government in the early days of the uprising. Despite the UN Security Council’s resolution and the NATO-led air raids, Gaddafi’s troops, who remain relatively loyal to him, remain firmly entrenched along the battle’s front-lines. Of course, these examples are not fixed representations [of what may happen in Syria], as the situation on the ground changes day by day or indeed hour by hour. However for regimes that are suffering from the same crisis [as Libya and Yemen], like Syria, the manner in which other regimes manage to cling to power is of great concern. This is to say that if others are capable of using force and arms to disperse demonstrators, then they [the Syrians] can also do so. Similarly, if superpowers have refrained from intervening in certain countries where clashes have broken out between the regime and demonstrators – due to their preoccupation with the situation in Libya – then this means that they [the Syrians] can do the same.

There can be no doubt that the demonstrators who have taken to the streets in Syria are risking their lives, and they no longer accept lacking even the most basic political and economic rights under the current regime. However as for their actual capacity to overthrow the regime, or their ability to replace it with a better alternative that can fill the security and political vacuum, this remains unclear at the moment.

The [Syrian] street is moving spontaneously, which means that there is no leadership, and there is no opposition party or internal institution that can take control of the country during a transitional period, should the regime collapse. There is another issue that means the Syrian crisis is hard to predict, and that is the lack of neutral observers and media outlets that are accurately reporting the situation in the country today. The Syrian regime has been a closed one for decades, and this is why there are no neutral studies or observations that allow us to draw a conclusion as to whether the regime will inevitably collapse, or whether Syria – as we have come to know it as an independent state – is capable of remaining unified should the country slide into chaos, and ethnic and sectarian divisions come to the surface.

In an article entitled “Syriana: After Bashar al-Assad, the deluge” (published on 20 April 2011 by Foreign Policy magazine) Robert D. Kaplan argues that the Syrian state would never have remained unified and cohesive over the past decades were it not the iron-fisted rule of the Baath party. In the period between 1947 and 1954, three national elections were held with each government ending in failure. Until 1970 [when Hafaz al-Assad took power] Syria witnessed 21 changes of government for a variety of reasons, most prominently the lack of a [Syrian] national identity which would bring together the different sects and ethnic groups. This is why the cross-border Baathist ideology, with dreams of a “Greater Syria”, enabled the regime to remain in power and justify its existence, by putting forward a scenario of compulsory unity in the face of an endless struggle. The regime was successful in exploiting the region’s minority card, and it further consolidated its presence by allying with Shiite Iran over the past three decades, in the face of Iraqi threats. Following the invasion of Iraq, it was made clear that Syria was the next target for “regime change” by the neo-conservatives [in the US].

The current situation can be traced to the position of minorities – whether in Syria or Lebanon. The active elements in the Syrian demonstrations, for the most part, are Sunnis and Kurds, the country’s largest sect and ethnic group. This does not mean that there are no Druze, Alawites, or Christians in the opposition, for small-scale opposition groups and trends have been formed that incorporate all social classes and ethnic and sectarian components. However it is necessary here to be aware that the ongoing popular uprising has a significant ethnic and sectarian dimension, and this is something that simultaneously threatens the regime, yet also strengthens its position. In other words, whilst this Sunni and Kurdish majority-led uprising may impact upon the Syrian regime, the other ethnic and sectarian minorities will support the regime and form a cohesive force that will allow the Syrian regime to withstand this leaderless uprising.

Kaplan wrote that “the Iraq war propelled millions of refugees to those two latter countries [Syria and Jordan], but the impact of Syria becoming a Levantine Yugoslavia might be even greater.”

In his book “Syria: Neither Bread nor Freedom” (Zed Books, 2003), Alan George tells a joke that was circulating in Syria following the failure of the “Damascus Spring”, a period of political debate following the death of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, after his son President Bashar al-Assad assumed the presidency. This period saw some Syrian intellectuals and activists encouraged to call for greater political and civil freedoms, however just six months later the regime suppressed these activities and put an end to any chance of social or civil openness, thereby making it impossible to lift the yoke of the Baath party. The joke tells the story of a deep hole in a Damascus street, which continues to injure pedestrians and damage vehicles, due to the lack of a warning sign. Some people wrote to the concerned authorities, asking them to fill in the hole or erect a warning sign. However the officials are content with assigning a nurse and an ambulance to be stationed close to the hole, in order to assist the injured. However the injuries soon increase day by day, to the point where the residents decide to complain about it to the district’s Baath party. The case is then transferred to the central authority of the ruling Baath party. Years later, and following numerous exchanged correspondence, the government decides to construct a hospital next to the hole, named after the late President’s son. However when this solution fails to appease the angry people, the highest authority in the country, namely the Regional Congress of the Baath Party, decides to dig up the entire street and tear down all the buildings! In Syria today, the hole of disagreements and division is too large to be filled!

First published in Asharq Alawsat newspaper on Thursday 28 April 2011 

The West’s leading scholar of the Middle East, Bernard Lewis, sees cause for optimism in the limited-government traditions of Arab and Muslim culture. But he says the U.S. should not push for quick, Western-style elections.

Two months shy of his 95th birthday, Mr. Lewis has been writing history books since before World War II. By 1950, he was already a leading scholar of the Arab world, and after 9/11, the vice president and the Pentagon’s top brass summoned him to Washington for his wisdom.

“I think that the tyrannies are doomed,” Mr. Lewis says as we sit by the windows in his library, teeming with thousands of books in the dozen or so languages he’s mastered. “The real question is what will come instead.”

For Americans who have watched protesters in Tunisia, Egypt, Iran, Libya, Bahrain and now Syria stand up against their regimes, it has been difficult not to be intoxicated by this revolutionary moment. Mr. Lewis is “delighted” by the popular movements and believes that the U.S. should do all it can to bolster them. But he cautions strongly against insisting on Western-style elections in Muslim lands.

“We have a much better chance of establishing—I hesitate to use the word democracy—but some sort of open, tolerant society, if it’s done within their systems, according to their traditions. Why should we expect them to adopt a Western system? And why should we expect it to work?” he asks.

Read full interview: The Wall Street Journal

The Dark Side of the Arab Uprisings

By Adel Al Toraifi

Recently in an IMF roundtable titled “Youth and Jobs in the Middle East”, Wael Ghoneim, an Egyptian blogger and activist, stirred a heated debate by accusing the IMF of aiding dictators in the region calling for a change in policy. Reading from an earlier IMF report which praised the economic performance of Ahmed Nazif’s former government, Wael accused the IMF of committing “crimes” rather than “mistakes” against Egypt. Ghoneim concluded his speech by saying: “Bailing out dictators or regimes that are basically totalitarian systems … giving them loans will make the people pay the interest while the top niche are making the money”.

Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the Managing Director of the IMF, responded by highlighting Ghoneim’s lack of understanding for the function of the IMF, saying ” We’re not bankers looking for customers”. While answering Ghonaim’s request for international organizations to aid Egypt by asking “So you promise that if the new government asks for help, you won’t blame me if we have the money?” Ghonaim replied jokingly “Well I’m a revolutionary, so I have to be against you by design!” Strauss-Kahn was not amused by the answer, and warned “You must not be a revolutionary just for the purpose of being a revolutionary, but you should have goals to fulfill.”

Basically, the debate has summed up to some extent the status of current Arab popular uprisings, which some in Egypt or Tunisia wish to call “revolutions”. These young revolutionaries are unaware of how states’ are run or how governments are operated, and secondly, perhaps most important of all, that these revolutionaries have no specific goals. This is unless we consider slogans such as “leave” or “the regime will be overthrown” as goals in themselves. It is clear that these countries are undergoing a difficult phase with an unpredictable future, but it is certain that in some cases, the main impetus at the moment is to “take revenge”. We may even say that there are now considerable attempts to brainwash the people into thinking that the past era was nothing but “corruption” and “deterioration”. This makes it sound as if we experienced no development or positive change over the past decades, which led us to the situation we face today.

For more than two decades, the prominent Lebanese writer Hazem Saghieh has been courageously and fearlessly writing about the necessity of “peace” and the false promise of Moqawama (armed resistance) of Hezbollah and other radical groups. He often warned against partisanship fueled by ethnic and sectarian prejudices. For Saghieh, radical Islamists and Ba’athists have long been seeking a utopian dream hijacking their own societies and utilizing the Moqawama discourse as means to justify their brutality.

Yet, like many other intellectuals, he has been amused by the recent events in the region. According to Saghiya, revolutions are rarely “beautiful” events, because they usually involve the killing of civilians, and in turn the instinct of revenge comes to the surface, both characteristics being the worst of human traits. But Hazem argues, in a recent article, that the recent “revolutions” across the Arab world have changed this perception, because they did not glorify martyrdom, but rather they were modest and compelling, with no totalitarian or fundamentalist undercurrents. He did, however, warn that these uprisings, although admirable, are still associated with prayer times and Friday gatherings, and that the military and the Muslim Brotherhood are still active in the current events. Nevertheless, he declared that: “The clear choice today is between a disaster which has been developing in multiple phases over dozens of years – one that will eventually lead us to a model similar to that of North Korea – and the disaster which is happening en masse at the moment, but may pave the way for foundations for the future” (On Current Revolutions, al-Hayat newspaper, April 16 2011)

Here, the prominent writer justifies the current chaos, and by doing so, he is committing two mistakes: First, when he assumes that the Arab world has been going from bad to worse in the past few decades. Second, when presumes that foundations for the future cannot be laid without a “revolution” – or a disaster as he named it. In this context, both Saghiya and Ghonaim regard the past era as one of pure evil; there were no accomplishments, projects, or a civil state prior to the revolution, and a better future cannot come about unless the regime is entirely eliminated.

No one would argue that Arab regimes have not been dominated by despotic trends, or have not involved gross corruption. Yet I would disagree with the assertion that the regime was the only source of the problem, or that no praiseworthy civil, legal or economic projects were achieved by past governments. Our problem lies in considering all aspects of the past as one, and in presuming that the coming eras will be better. Contrary to what some believe, some Arab states achieved some form of advancements in several aspects over the past two decades, whereby the economic performance improved, and significant legal and legislative reforms were undertaken. No one can compare the current status of many Arab countries to their situation two or three decades ago. The aim here is not to defend these regimes, for they were undemocratic and despotic, and corruption indeed prevailed, but it is wrong to pass unfair judgments on the past, and say that our status today is worse than the situation two or three decades ago, or say that no positive projects or laws have been passed that should be maintained and promoted.

The “revolutionary” logic, which presumes that societies can eliminate their past and build a future from nothing, is a kind of transcendent Utopia. This only pushes societies into conflict with their own ethnic and social components, whereby some attempt to gain victories over others.

Here we have to be cautious of brainwashing attempts, because Dr. Ahmed Nazif’s government (2004-2011) did indeed achieve economic growth for years in Egypt. If that growth did not reach the poorer classes, this is not because the IMF or the government did so intentionally, but because the Egyptian economy – which has and still is based on subsidizing commodities, and excessive recruitment in the public sector – is not compatible with the required economic reform criteria. For decades, successive Egyptian governments continued to work according to this equation to meet the requirements of the poor majority, yet with the sharp increase in the world food prices, widespread inflation, and the global financial crises in recent years, the regime reached an impasse. The problem does not lie in placing the responsibility only on the former president or his government, and presuming that matters will improve when they leave.

Egypt’s economic problems are too entrenched to be solved by any government, and they will continue to persist unless prerequisites for serious –painful- economic reforms are ensured. No government will be successful in doing so unless it puts an end to squandering state finance, which is wastefully spent on subsidies and recruitment projects. The question is who would dare to do so? When such reform is enacted, it will do even more harm to the poorer classes in the short run.

Hazem Abdul-Rahman, a renowned Egyptian writer, said recently: “It is not wise to bang the drum and cheer just because we ousted the former president and his aides. There is a considerable part of the Egyptian people’s silent majority who remain sympathetic towards him. Mubarak maintained Egypt’s territories and did not leave it under foreign occupation. He raised the Egyptian flag on Taba, and offered unprecedented public freedoms. His reign was distinguished by the significant presence of the opposition in parliament, except for the most recent cabinet which was devoid of all opposition figures, and was marred by vote rigging” (We Want a Trial, not Revenge. Al-Ahram newspaper, 16 April 2011).

Arab societies have the right to shake off their despotic past, yet it is wrong to think that all problems are solved just by ousting the regime. Arab states are suffering social, religious and economic problems that are not necessarily the creation of current regimes. Rather, these all are problems that will continue to persist unless societies confront them with true change.

Revolutions are not always positive, and the current phase may not simply be a peaceful transition, for the current chaos and abuse may continue for decades, and may even give rise to further authoritarian regimes, and create more secluded societies. A number of states in Eastern Europe experienced regime change following the downfall of the Soviet Union, yet after 20 years they have not been able to fully remedy their social and economic ills, despite consecutive parliamentary elections. Three decades after the revolution, present-day Iran is still suffering from an authoritarian rule that far surpasses that of the Shah era. The Iranians are experiencing poor social and economic conditions, a lack of freedom, and far worse oppression worst than in the period prior to the revolution. The crucial factor is not the revolution and its slogans, or the trial of the former president, using the same authoritarian means. Rather, the crucial factor is to build countries on the grounds of justice and tolerance, and aspire for cooperation with others, understanding that the principles of economic growth are not necessarily “idealistic” revolutionary prerequisites.

First Published in Asharq Alawsat Newspaper on Wednesday 20 April 2011.

The problem with Egypt’s revolutionary generation is illustrated in this debate between IMF Director, Dominique Strauss-Kahn,  and the Egyptian internet activist Wael Ghonim. The later was clearly naive in his understanding of Egypt’s economic troubles and radical in his views towards the necessary change in his homeland. After a heated debate between the two, Ghonim concluded: “Well I’m a revolutionary, so I have to be against you by design!”, which Mr Kahn replied: “Don’t be a revolutionary because you want to be one, but because you believe in something”.

Watch the video: IMF

By Adel Al Toraifi

Over the past week, three Arab regimes are continuing their struggle to stay in power; these are the Libyan, Syrian, and Yemeni [regimes]. Regarding the first regime, the situation has transformed into a “hit and run” war between opponents of Colonel Gaddafi and his supporters, whilst the NATO air strikes have failed to resolve the battle on the ground in favor of the rebels. The second case has taken on a factional and sectarian dimension, with the majority confronting a security and partisan regime that remains in power despite the bold events taking place in the country. As for the third regime, the president is standing alone, facing the defection of senior commanders and allies, who are joining the opposition. There are two prominent features evident in all these cases: the incapability of the opposition movement – or the armed rebels – to forcibly remove the leader and his regime, as well as their rejection of any mediation or solution that includes the safe departure of the leader and key government figures, or their agreement not to prosecute members of the former regime [in return for transition of power].
In Libya, the African Union and Turkey both provided initiatives for a solution, but the Libyan National Transitional Council rejected these because they did not include the immediate removal of Colonel Gaddafi and his family [from power]. In Yemen, the Joint Meeting Parties opposition coalition expressed their reservations about the Gulf initiative because it was said to have included provisions ensuring immunity for the president during the transitional phase.
The crisis of [finding] an “exit” for Arab leaders is one of the biggest obstacles to a peaceful transition of power, in an atmosphere of political turmoil and directionless youth uprisings. The exit door seems closed, and the hawks in the opposition seem determined to present the president and the whole of his regime as offerings to the young rebels in the streets. The regime itself feels it is under a severe blockade, and perhaps the only way to survive is to fight until the last man. Perhaps Gaddafi’s “Zenga Zenga” speech is a genuine reflection of the way in which regimes and their key figures view their personal fate. The Egyptian and Tunisian models do not provide any confidence or security for those who remain in charge of Arab republics. Former Tunisian President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali has had an international arrest warrant issued against him, whilst former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak faces a subpoena from the Egyptian attorney-general. Despite his speech which was broadcast on “Al-Arabiya”, in response to what he called a smear campaigns against him, the state of anger and agitation against Mubarak is still prominent on the Egyptian street, prompting the current government to prosecute him. Perhaps the prevalence of the spirit of revenge and personal accountability has put the [Egyptian] Supreme Council of the Armed Forces under pressure to quickly imprison the majority of ministers who were members of former Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif’s government. This has raised a lot of questions about the legality of the precautionary measures, and the extent of the politicization and selectivism in the accusations submitted to the [Egyptian] Attorney-General.
No president, minister, or general, wants to find themselves in jail wearing a white jumpsuit, after their power and wealth has been seized, and their reputation ruined. Therefore, some of those in power are holding on to this – under these circumstances – not just for its own sake, but because their own fate, and that of their families, are also at stake.
Here, advocates of regime change are facing a moral dilemma: Do they show tolerance towards the president and symbols of the former regime, prioritizing stability and ensuring that the transition process doesn’t transform into an open battle of score settling against those who deserve to be brought to account, as well as those who don’t? Or, is it necessary to hold the president and his men to account in order to cleanse oneself of the previous era, and ensure that the past does not repeat itself in the future?
There is no doubt that attempting to prosecute any president is not easy, and all those who assume in advance that the president is guilty, and that it is sufficient to prove one or two cases against him to ensure his conviction, are mistaken for two reasons: Firstly the president in most countries of the world governs according to the law and the constitution, that is, he does not need to break the law in most cases because he can change it, or instruct parliament to amend the constitution, so that he can do whatever he wants. Thus, from a legal and constitutional perspective, the president has acted in accordance with his presidential powers. Even in Libya, Muammar Gaddafi only took decisions based on the legitimacy of the popular committees. Secondly, presidents often deal with important state affairs or major national interests, i.e. macro politics, and do not interfere or administer the affairs of central or local government, i.e. micro politics.
What does this mean? In short, the president only signs laws and regulations that have passed through parliament or after these decisions and projects have passed through dozens of committees, councils and local governments. This means that the president is only part of what happens. This does not mean that the president is innocent or should be acquitted, but it is important to realize that often it is difficult to find conclusive, compelling evidence that can be used in court to convict leaders. There are a few cases where the attorney general can convict the president on personal grounds, but these are rare because of the nature of the presidential position in a republican or parliamentary regime. Take the Iraq war for example, and the British Iraq War Inquiry [also referred to as the Chilcot Inquiry] which has heard, and continues to hear, dozens of testimonies attributing responsibility for the decision to go to war to the British Prime Minister and his government. In Egypt for example, former Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif was eventually imprisoned due to a car number plates scandal, and this is a different issue to the slogans originally raised against him, and accusations of dictatorship lodged against the regime. In France and Italy there have also been attempts to prosecute the president, but they often clash with the constitution and the presidential system itself.
The countries of the Arab world that are experiencing political turmoil can benefit from previous examples that prioritized the interests of stability, and who moved forward during the transitional process, choosing to cleanse the situation, as happened in Iraq recently. [President] Suharto ruled Indonesia between 1968 and 1998, the year that his reign came to an end was the same year that he won elections for a new term. As was the case in the Egypt of old, Suharto’s party dominated the parliament, and his family and regime had the lion’s share of the state’s economy and wealth, sparking a massive youth uprising against him. University students protested for months, and then key areas of the capital were occupied. The police intervened to disperse the demonstrations and dozens were killed, with Suharto ultimately forced to resign under public pressure. The military and the political elite were faced with two options: either allow the president to leave with dignity, resigning from his position in favor of Vice President [Bacharuddin Jusuf] Habibie, with power being handed over in accordance with the constitution, regardless of the volume of criticism against him, or the army would have to resort to forcibly expelling the president which would see the country drowning in chaos and retaliation. The people of Indonesia chose the first option and power was handed over, whilst the former President was granted immunity and protection, and went to live in an apartment complex in Jakarta. Of course, there were those who demanded that Suharto be tried, but the political elite was aware that it was necessary to maintain the prestige of the former president, because like any president he had supporters and a degree of popularity, and by doing so, they would preserve the dignity of the presidential institution and the state. Thus when Suharto died his presidential funeral was even attended by some of his opponents, who he had placed in prison.
Another example took place in Chile, where General Augusto Pinochet ruled via a military coup until a massive popular uprising was staged in 1988, where Pinochet was forced to amend the constitution and approve presidential and parliamentary elections at the end of the following year. The opposition went on to win, so what did Chile do? Pinochet was granted the title of “Senator for Life” in the first constitutional amendment adopted after the election, and he subsequently went into exile. When human rights groups sought to try him through British courts in 2000, the British authorities allowed him to leave on the grounds of illness. He returned to his country in the same year, and despite many attempts to prosecute him, he was exempted from prosecution on several occasions until his death. He was never convicted of any of the charges brought against him. Despite the government’s refusal to recognize him as a former president, he was granted a military funeral under the title of former Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, and flags flew at half-mast at all military bases.
Even the United States, characterized by its republican system, Supreme Court, and unique democracy, did not imprison President Nixon after the “Watergate” scandal, but rather he was granted a presidential pardon, and his funeral was attended by the U.S. President. As for President Clinton, who lied in court regarding the case of Monica Lewinsky, he overcame a vote of no confidence by a small margin, but then emerged as a statesman and a man of peace, touring the world to promote his charitable foundation.
The Arab republics are faced with two options, they can either overcome the past through tolerance, and prioritizing the peaceful transition of power, or they can drown in the mire of chaos and revenge. Did [current prime minister] Essam Sharaf in Egypt, [chairman of the rebel National Transitional Council] Mustafa Abdul Jalil and [Libyan rebel army leader] Abdul Fattah Younis in Libya not serve in governments under dictatorial regimes? Were these figures, until recently, not extremely close to the same regimes and figures that the people today want to see brought to trial?
It is easy to court the revolutionaries by calling for the president’s head, but until recently weren’t they all “the president’s men”?

First Published in Asharq Alawsat Newspaper on Thursday 14 April 2011. 

By Adel Al Toraifi

On a hot summer evening in 1988, Ayatollah Khomeini was performing his prayers when one of his aides informed him that an Iranian passenger jet had crashed while en route to Dubai airport, and there was a strong possibility that the plane was downed by the US marine forces deployed in the Gulf. Imam Khomeini recommended that state officials should be extremely cautious and avoid any hasty reactions, as Iran was still in a state of war with Iraq, and the country’s military and economic capabilities were severely limited. The official state apparatus heeded this advice, and a few members of the Supreme Guide’s inner circle were assigned to deal with the crisis. Despite a torrent of condemnations, unrest was curbed in most Iranian cities, and protests were limited to staged demonstrations by the pro-regime “Basij” forces. When a heated debate took place within the parliament, regarding the regime’s apparent slackness in reacting to the US strike, Imam Khomeini sent a letter to the parliament in which he demanded that MPs exercise “wisdom” and being aware of public interests, thus giving a diplomatic solution a chance.
But why resort to diplomacy with the “Great Devil”?
An incident such as this could have transformed into massive public and official demonstrations. Yet despite all the manifestations of hostility towards the US, and the instigative, condemning speeches all over Iran, the reactions to the incident remained calm. There are two reasons for this, one was clear, whilst the other was concealed. The apparent reason was that Iran was about to reach a ceasefire agreement with Iraq, whereas the concealed reason – and perhaps the most significant one – was that the regime feared the wrath of the masses. During the two years prior to the incident, Iran had made successful advances on the battlefront with Iraq. Iraq attempted to allude towards a peaceful settlement, yet Khomeini and his men insisted they were victorious, and would only accept a peace settlement if the Baath Party admitted defeat. However, the Iranian military advance was short lived, after Iraq received more advanced weaponry. The regime’s stubborn attitude, its refusal to consider Iraq’s calls to end the war, in addition to deteriorating economic and living conditions, caused a state of fierce pubic strife.
In the face of a growing number of voices denouncing the war, Khomeini launched a large-scale religious campaign to call youths for martyrdom. Armed with such false enthusiasm, the regime sent hundreds of youths to the battlefront, although they had not received sufficient military training or the necessary equipment. Each young soldier had a plastic key hanging from his neck, symbolizing the key for heaven which he would enter once he died. Such hopeless attempts were not successful, and the public strife increased to the extent that the government had to ban demonstrations, for fear that they may turn into anti-government protests. In a message which many Iranians may still remember, Mehdi Bazerkan, the former Prime Minister, wrote to Imam Khomeini saying: “If you believe that we should sacrifice ourselves and our rights in order to export and impose the Islamic Revolution, you have that option, but this must not be imposed upon everyone. Since 1986, you have not stopped declaring victories, yet now you demand people to sacrifice until victory is achieved. Is this not an admission of failure on your part? When will you stop trading with the blood of our martyrs?”
Today, the region is facing similar incidents, as the Iranian regime since 2009 has been suffering a state of internal division and fear on the streets, after the conservatives and Revolutionary Guards revolted against the election results. The regime has recently acted to thwart what it termed demonstrations by the “pro-Islamic revolutionaries”, which have erupted in countries throughout the region, fearing that these demonstrations would shift into an anti-government popular strife. In reaction to the statement issued by the GCC Foreign Ministers, condemning Iran’s attempts to destabilize the situation in Bahrain and Kuwait, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said “this announcement lacks any legal value, as it was made under pressure of the US and its allies. It is outrageous to send the GCC Shield Forces there, so withdraw.”
It is clear that the conservatives in Iran have been surprised by the GCC Shield Force intervention in Bahrain, particularly with the emergence of a unified Gulf stance against Iran. For over six years, the conservatives in Iran stepped up their rhetoric, whilst the regime contended itself with issuing brief statements. The Iranians used to believe that disagreements and splits between the Gulf States would hinder the formation of a unified stance against their interventions.
Ever since their return to power in 2005, the conservatives continued to believe that the best way to protect the regime was to use the language of confrontation, coordinate with their allies to impose their “resistance” agenda, and reactivate intelligence activities in the Gulf states. The death squad incidents in Iraq, the Lebanon war in 2006, the Hezbollah seizure of Beirut in 2008, and the Gaza war in 2009 have all gone according to a predetermined systematic plan to strengthen the Iranian influence, following the downfall of Baghdad and the formation of an Iraqi government subservient to Tehran. We must remember that the conservatives, although they departed the presidential corridors following the 1997 election, continue to dominate all security and military apparatuses. Suffice to say, dozens of espionage cases that were uncovered in the Gulf were attributed to the reactivation of Iranian intelligence activity in 2001.
Without a doubt, the strong and decisive reaction by the Gulf States [in Bahrain] has confused the regime in Tehran, at an extremely sensitive time. Iran, which rejoiced at the downfall of some Arab regimes as a result of the popular uprisings, now feels it faces the same internal danger as well; as any demonstration or internal weakness could transform into a popular uprising in opposition to the regime. Iran cannot remain silent regarding what is happening to some of the pro-Iranian opposition elements in Bahrain, yet at the same time, it cannot intervene directly. This is not because of the US troops deployed in the Gulf, but because if it did so, it would face the Gulf States as one entity. These counties are now in possession of military forces and equipment sufficient to make Iran realize that it may not be able to wage a blitzkrieg and achieve a quick victory, but rather it may even lose the battle, despite its huge arsenal of ballistic missiles.
Iran is also concerned about the situation in Syria, and is conscious that regime change in Syria may jeopardize Iranian interests; whereby its logistical support to Hezbollah and Hamas would be cut off and its influence in the Iraqi arena would be undermined.
The Gulf states should be aware that the Iranian regime currently feels besieged, and is entertaining doubts that the regional events may give its popular opposition the momentum to stand on its feet once again, after it was oppressed in the 2009 election. Yet at the same time, Iran senses it is now face to face with a necessary survival battle, and therefore, it may resort to more radical solutions to export the crisis abroad, under the slogans of “sectarianism” and resisting the US and Israel. Yet the chances of Iran waging open wars are limited, because the price will be too high – at least in the current stage. Iran’s deplorable economic condition will not allow it to suspend its oil exports for a single day. This is in addition to the multi-year sanctions that have undermined the regime’s mobility.
This does not mean we should underestimate Iran’s ability to react, but rather the Gulf states should realize that they were successful in taking a preventive action [in Bahrain], and they should exploit this politically in two directions: internally, by ensuring political solutions to alleviate the sectarian strife in the Gulf, so Iran cannot exploit the situation, and externally, by distinguishing between the conservatives and the Iranian opposition, in official Gulf discourse. Yet at the same time, the door must be left ajar so that negotiations with Iran remain possible in the future, if it seeks to amend the situation. These steps must be adopted through a unified strategy that bears in mind what the Iranians should do to restore confidence between the two parties.
The conservatives in Tehran have always ventured, and have long been engaged in hostility and provocative discourse with others. However, in cases when they must choose between the existence of the regime or its downfall, they are always ready to retreat, and this is what the Gulf leadership should consider carefully. 

First Published in Asharq Alawsat Newspaper on Wednesday 06 April 2011.

By Adel Al Toraifi

When the events [Muslim Brotherhood uprising against the Syrian regime] broke out in Hama in February 1982, the revolutionary leadership in Iran found itself facing a difficult test, being forced to choose between supporting the ruling (secular) Baath Party, or championing the armed Muslim Brotherhood revolutionaries, whose beliefs were closer to the ideology of the radical mullahs. The al-Assad’s regime and the Muslim Brotherhood were amongst the first to recognize the Iranian revolution, and Syria provided logistical support to Iran in its wars in Iraq and Lebanon. Damascus had also put itself forward as an ambassador for Iranian interests, particularly towards the Soviet Union and the Arab States. As for the Muslim Brotherhood, they considered the Islamic Revolution in Iran to be a sign of the region’s thirst for an Islamic model of rule, and a number of Muslim Brotherhood advocates tried to use the Iranian Revolution as a tool for support and pressure in their confrontation of the Arab regimes. However, the phase of reconciliation and harmony between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Iranian regime ended when on the eve of the events in Hama, former Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati announced that Iran was standing alongside President Hafez al-Assad, describing Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood as “agents of America and Zionism”. Since then, Tehran has stood by President al-Assad during even more difficult circumstances, and even when competition was mounting between followers of the two sides in Lebanon, Tehran remained sensitive to its special relationship with Syria.
Today, Syria is facing a major challenge to its legitimacy, in the form of massive popular demonstrations in a number of cities. The question that is preoccupying observers today relates to the future of the Iranian-Syrian axis, which has existed since 1979, and whether this will be able to continue in the event of regime change.
What is happening in Syria represents a genuine challenge to the legitimacy of President Bashar al-Assad, and the Syrian Baath Party, and the survival of the regime will depend on its ability to contain the popular discontent. However, what is certain is that if violent demonstrations continue, and spread to the capital Damascus, this will only increase the likelihood of the president’s departure and regime change. At the present time, Syrian authorities are trying to use a mixture of security force on the ground, whilst offering unprecedented concessions, in order to alleviate the spread of civil disobedience. It has been stressed on more than one occasion that the demonstrations have a “sectarian” nature, and this is true. The Syrian Baath party previously included, and still does, a large proportion of the Sunni community; however its leadership ranks include many who belong to different sects. It must also be noted that the sectarian pluralism within the Baath party has tended – particularly over the past two decades – towards the Alawite sect, which is the same thing that happened in the Iraqi Baath Party, which became extremely Sunni during the mid-1980s. There were objective reasons for this change, perhaps the most important was the repeated coup attempts by Sunni officers, either being instigated by the Iraqi Baath party in the 1970s, or as a result of a sectarian rift between the Sunnis and the Alawites, which led to the armed Hama uprising [by the Muslim Brotherhood against the Syrian government].
The Syrian regime, which has been in power for over four decades, was able to overcome a number of challenges, such as the 1973 [Yom Kippur] war, and even internal divisions between key figures in the regime, as occurred in 1984, 1991, and 1999. However, the regime’s legitimacy internally has always been questionable, and the regime has resorted to severe measures in the management of its internal affairs. The government disrupted any attempts regarding the development of political parties, and quelled the emergence of views outside the umbrella of the authority. The main weapon of the regime was, and remains, the use of the “resistance” card to oppose peace agreements, as well as the exploitation of Palestinian and Lebanese groups to influence Arab public opinion. It could be argued that Syria was able to draw a realistic picture of “Arab nationalism”, and impose great respect for President Hafez al-Assad as a strong and influential political figure in the region. Thus, some experts argue that Syria could not sacrifice its external positions, and sign peace agreements, without compromising its regional legitimacy.
Syria enjoyed participation in a tripartite axis (Saudi Arabia – Egypt – Syria) since the mid 1990s, and this strengthened Syria’s position, and opened it up economically to Gulf investments. However, when Bashar al-Assad came to power Syria began to fluctuate in its positions, and the 2003 Iraq War played a significant role in directing Syria towards extremism, and intransigence in its regional positions. The Syrian regime felt that it was the target of US pressure, and consequently began an intelligence war to destabilize Iraq, and Prime Minister [Rafik] Hariri was assassinated during the Syrian occupation of Lebanon. With the rise of the conservatives and the Revolutionary Guards in Iran, al-Assad became a strategic pawn in the Iranian plan, and Syria transformed over time from Iran’s equal partner to nothing more than a junior partner, equivalent in value to an armed group such as Hezbollah. Some Arab countries tried to isolate Syria in order to pressure it to reduce its ties to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s project. Between 2007 and 2010, many initiatives were offered to Syria to urge it to change its extremist and uncompromising positions, but to no avail. President al-Assad was quick to accept the initiatives, but without offering anything in return and only after agreement with Iran, prompting many to believe that his regime did nothing but provide its visitors with lengthy lectures, and that the real solution was to be found in Tehran, rather than Damascus.
At the beginning of the recent unrest, President Bashar al-Assad was quick to conduct an interview with the Wall Street Journal, in which he talked about styles of governance – in a manner of offering advice – in which he criticized the Tunisian and Egyptian presidents. He described them as not being responsive to the will of the people who sought “resistance”, saying that Syria is immune to what happened because the regime did not abandon resistance in confronting Israel, as other [Arab] states did. However, just six weeks later al-Assad has found himself facing the same fate, which means that the “resistance” is not immune to the demands of change. Currently, the Syrian regime is seeking support from some Arab states, and these are the same states which al-Assad previously described as “half-men” [for criticizing Hezbollah]. At the same time, the Americans, the Europeans and some Gulf states have quickly moved to confront Gaddafi in Libya, yet they do not exercise the same enthusiasm in criticizing the abuses of the Syrian regime when dealing with protestors and riots. Here, [US Secretary of State] Hilary Clinton has said that the United States does not intend to carry out any sort of military intervention, and that “Syria is not Libya”, even going as far as to describe al-Assad as a “reformer.”

There can be no doubt that there are flaws, and double standards, with regards to how crises affecting the region are being dealt with, for during the past decade even Gaddafi’s regime was described as moving towards reform, but we have clearly seen the result of the regime’s insistence on remaining in power, and the same applies to the Syrian regime in Hama in 1982. It seems that for the first time the United States and Iran – and possibly even Israel – all agree on the necessity of the Syrian regime’s survival, for the collapse of the regime could harm everybody’s interests, for as the saying goes, “better the devil you know.”
In his book “Assad: The Struggle for the Middle East” (1998), Patrick Seale states that President Hafez al-Assad was suffering from depression in the late 1980s. Seale claims that al-Assad hardly appeared outside of his well-guarded office, and only dealt with his generals and ministers over the phone. He would sometimes call his foreign ambassadors in the middle of the night, talking to them about the history of Syria until the early hours of the morning, and asking his guards to prepare cups of tea. At this time, an armed Iranian group kidnapped a Syrian intelligence officer in Tehran. Al-Assad was disturbed by the incident, particularly the Iranian group’s affiliation to Lebanon’s Hezbollah. Tehran threatened to sever relations [with Hezbollah] unless the officer was returned within 48 hours, and this is indeed what happened. President Hafez al-Assad benefited from this lesson, and made moves to open up to some Arab countries and reduce Syria’s dependence on Iran. He supported the Taif Agreement, despite Iranian reservations and Hezbollah’s non-participation. Damascus moved closer to the Clinton administration, to the point that in 1998 the Iranians feared that al-Assad was on the verge of sacrificing Syria’s relations with Tehran.
Today, Syrian-Iranian relations are experiencing a major test, but it is certain that these will witness major transformations. 

First Published in Asharq Alawsat on Thursday 31 March 2011